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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In October 2009, the Innovation Center for U.S. Dairy (ICD) released what is arguably the most comprehensive 
analysis ever produced of the global economic environment facing the U.S. dairy industry.  
The ICD forecasts that net global import demand for dairy products will grow faster than net export supply 
at least through the next decade. The strong import demand growth is projected to come mainly from develop-
ing economies in Asia, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East.  The ICD contends that the U.S. dairy 
industry can be well positioned to fill the export demand gap (excess of demand over supply) in the near term 
(10-15 years).  But, beyond this 10-15 year window of opportunity, new sources of low cost supply from Brazil, 
the Ukraine and other countries might deliver significant quantities of competing dairy products onto the global 
market, blunting or eliminating U.S. export opportunities.  
Brazil clearly could become a major supplier of dairy products for the world market, and before 10-15 years.   
The Ukraine appears much less likely to become a major dairy exporting country in the foreseeable future.  
If U.S. dairy companies take early actions to become more globally competitive, they could escape the role of 
residual supplier, increase the percentage of differentiated dairy products in their export product mix, and limit the 
amount of head-to-head competition they face from emerging country suppliers of commodity dairy products. .  
The ICD concluded that New Zealand—with its pasture-based farming system—cannot increase milk produc-
tion by much more than about 30 percent in the next five years. This suggests that New Zealand will have lim-
ited ability to fill the forecasted dairy export demand gap. The ICD’s emphasis on country (rather than company) 
sources of increased dairy supplies understates the competitive threats facing U.S. dairy exporters.  For example, 
Fonterra of New Zealand—the world’s largest dairy exporting firm—is well-equipped to access dairy products 
from many locations outside New Zealand, including the U.S. and South American countries. If Fonterra can 
secure needed expansion capital, the cooperative will compete vigorously with U.S. firms and others to fill the 
projected dairy product demand gap and will not be heavily constrained by milk production in New Zealand.  In 
addition, big international dairy-food companies such as Nestle, which can also source dairy products from loca-
tions world-wide, will compete strongly to fill the dairy export demand gap.   
In discussing “wild cards” that will affect dairy exports, the ICD provided mixed signals about the impact of 
exchange rates on U.S. dairy exports. Exchange rates are notoriously difficult to predict accurately.  A likely sce-
nario for the next year or two is for the U.S. dollar to remain relatively strong relative to the euro, in particular. 
Over the longer-run, however, the U.S. dollar is likely to weaken relative to the currencies of other major dairy 
exporting countries.  The weak dollar will help to keep U.S. current account deficits manageable and make U.S. 
dairy exports and other dairy exports priced in U.S. dollars relatively inexpensive.  Dairy farmers and exporters in 
countries with currencies that strengthen relative to the U.S. dollar (probably including Brazil and Australia) will 
be adversely affected when dairy exports priced in U.S. dollars are converted to their local currencies. 
The ICD analyzed four strategic options that the U.S. dairy industry could pursue to take advantage of emerg-
ing export demand opportunities, namely fortress USA, status quo, consistent exporter, and global dairy player.   
The ICD’s board of directors recommended that the U.S. dairy industry pursue the consistent exporter option. The An Evaluation of The Impact of Globalization on the U.S. Dairy Industry: Threats, Opportunities and Implications
2  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-2
global dairy player option was regarded as a stretch for the U.S. dairy industry but might be feasible to pursue after 
the industry gains experience with the consistent export option.  
The ICD recommended a number of company-specific and collective industry actions to implement the con-
sistent exporter strategy.  All the actions appeared to represent sound business or policy practices.  However, the 
reforms of regulated milk pricing and dairy price supports recommended by the Center are likely to be difficult to 
achieve. Trade policy measures recommended by the Center also show little prospect of success, at least in the near 
term, given the stalled WTO Doha Round negotiations. 
Strategies which U.S. dairy firms could pursue to export successfully were analyzed, including those employed 
by three global dairy players: Fonterra of New Zealand, the Kerry Group of Ireland, and Nestle of Switzerland. 
Emulating the strategies of these firms could help U.S. dairy firms become successful, consistent exporters.  
Fonterra of New Zealand is supplied by low cost producers, has achieved economies of scale in processing, and 
has produced differentiated dairy products.  The benefits of these three items are additive. The cooperative contin-
ues to struggle to obtain needed capital. 
The Kerry Group of Ireland adjusted effectively to the hostile economic environment facing the firm in the 
1970s.  Kerry has prospered by acquiring food ingredients firms, implementing sophisticated R&D programs, and 
converting from a cooperative to a public limited company, which has a market capitalization of about US$5.0 bil-
lion.
Nestle, the world’s largest food company, has sophisticated R&D capabilities and global reach.  The firm has 
focused successfully on the long-run and has balanced sales between low-risk, low-growth countries of the devel-
oped world and high-risk, high growth countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The firm has developed or 
acquired a large stable of successful brands. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-2  3
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In October 2009, the Innovation Center for U.S. 
Dairy (ICD) publicly released a summary of the results 
of an extensive study of U.S. dairy export opportuni-
ties in a report titled, The Impact of Globalization on 
the U.S. Dairy Industry: Threats, Opportunities and 
Implications, Globalization. The study is arguably the 
most  comprehensive  analysis  ever  produced  of  the 
global economic environment facing the U.S. dairy 
industry. Dairy Management Inc., and the U.S. Dairy 
Export Council (USDEC) provided staff assistance in 
conducting the study. Underlying research and analy-
sis was carried out by Bain & Company, a major man-
agement consulting firm. 
In developing the report, the goals of the ICD and 
associated organizations were as follows [25]:
•  Primary: To provide a strategic analysis of the 
global dairy landscape and establish a common 
understanding of the challenges, opportunities 
and threats posed by increasing globalization to 
the U.S. dairy industry.
•  Secondary: To determine from the analysis 
if there are suitable programs of work at an 
industry level to address the opportunities and 
challenges of globalization, and thus help U.S. 
dairy industry participants be better prepared to 
compete for increased sales in the global dairy 
marketplace, including dairy demand in the U.S. 
Based on findings in the report, the ICD board of 
directors recommended that the U.S. dairy industry 
pursue a consistent exporter option. Interestingly, 
the ICD’s exhaustive analysis provides support for 
earlier observations made by Thomas Suber, then 
Executive  Director  of  the  USDEC,  who  in  1999 
characterized the U.S. dairy industry as one where 
real costs of milk production are declining, domes-
tic  demand  is  growing  modestly,  and  the  role  of 
government is declining. Suber claimed that under 
these  conditions  “…the  processors,  cooperatives, 
traders, and farmers who determine USDEC policy 
face the future with a cold realism that either we 
compete internationally or we shrink as an indus-
try [40].” For the most part, ICD’s findings also are 
consistent with those appearing in studies carried 
out by the Babcock Institute [13,14,15,16,17]. 
The  ICD  is  to  be  commended  for  obtaining 
insights from a task force of experienced officials of 
major dairy companies (listed in the Appendix) who 
are involved in exporting dairy products manufac-
tured in the United States. These companies included 
Glanbia, United Dairymen of Arizona, Dairy Farm-
ers of America, Darigold, California Dairies, Inc., 
Schreiber Foods, and Leprino Foods. The massive 
Dairy Globalization Project Fact Base developed by 
Bain & Company also provided detailed support for 
findings and recommendations in the study. 
The purposes of this Discussion Paper are to (a) 
briefly summarize key findings and recommendations 
in the ICD report, (b) summarize exporting options 
for the U.S. dairy industry considered by the ICD, 
(c) raise questions about certain findings and recom-
mendations in the report, and (d) discuss strategies 
that U.S. companies and the U.S. dairy industry might 
employ to exploit opportunities in the emerging global 
dairy environment. 
This summary of the ICD’s findings and recom-
mendations should not be regarded as a substitute for 
careful reading the October 2009 report itself. Indeed, 
in the opinion of this writer, the ICD report should 
be required reading for anyone concerned about the 
future of the U.S. dairy industry. 
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Selected  findings  that  underpin  the  ICD  report’s 
conclusions can be categorized as demand and supply 
factors [25]: 
Demand Factors
•  The number of middle-class consumers in 
emerging markets will triple by 2030, reaching 
one billion in that year. These consumers will 
demand more animal proteins for their diets, 
including dairy products.
•  China has 20 percent of the world’s population 
and growing per capita income. China’s dairy 
product consumption is expected to increase by 
about 10 percent annually in the coming years.
•  Dairy product consumption is expected to grow 
by 4 to 9 percent annually in Southeast Asia, 
depending upon the country. 
•  Mexico, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia have recorded 
increases in dairy product consumption and are 
open to dairy imports. Mexico, in particular, will 
continue to represent a growing market for U.S. 
dairy exports. 
•  Canada is unlikely to change the country’s 
protective dairy policies in the foreseeable future. 
This will limit access to Canada’s dairy markets. 
Supply Factors
•  New Zealand has the potential to increase total 
milk production by not much more than about 
30 percent over the next five years using the 
country’s pasture-based model. Fonterra, a New 
Zealand cooperative that is the world’s largest 
dairy exporting firm, faces challenges including 
those associated with managing member-
producers’ differing views on strategic direction 
for the firm, environmental activism, and 
difficulties in raising sufficient capital. 
•  Australia’s future milk production and dairy 
product export growth will be limited by 
persistent drought.
•  EU milk production is expected to grow at less 
than one percent annually over the next five years 
as producers and processors adjust to reduced 
government support. Net EU exports will fall as 
consumption growth outpaces production growth.
•  Brazil will become a major source of low-cost 
dairy products in the next 15 years. 
•  While Argentina will continue to export dairy 
products, it will not become a global production 
and exporting leader due to chronic economic, 
political, and climate instability. 
•  Ukraine may become a key source of low-cost 
milk production and dairy exports. 
•  The U.S. accounts for 13 percent of global 
milk production and 17 percent of key tradable 
commodity dairy production, including butter, 
cheese, and nonfat dry milk. The U.S. has a 
flexible and diverse supply and processing 
base, and could be well positioned to expand 
production if global opportunities are available. 
Based on these major demand and supply factors, 
the ICD projects that net global import demand for 
dairy products will grow faster than net export sup-
ply through 2013, leading to a latent demand gap that 
will exist for additional years. Demand growth in this 
period is projected to come mainly from developing 
economies in Asia, Latin America, North Africa, and 
the Middle East. 
These findings are broadly consistent with demand 
figures reported by C.K. Prahalad in his book entitled, 
“The  Fortune  at  the  Bottom  of  the  Pyramid  [40].” 
Prahalad points out that more than 4.0 billion people 
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make up the bottom of the pyramid and that nine coun-
tries—China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Indone-
sia, Turkey, South Africa and Thailand—collectively 
are home to about 3.0 billion people, representing 70 
percent of the developing world population. He adds 
that in purchasing power parity terms, the group of 
nine has a Gross Domestic Product of $12.5 trillion, 
which represents 90 percent of the developing world 
total. Prahalad’s figures, like those of the ICD, identify 
the huge latent demand existing in developing coun-
tries.
While  the  ICD  forecasts  of  future  conditions  in 
global dairy markets are plausible, they must be inter-
preted with caution. Recall that few if any analysts 
predicted the severity of the 2008-2009 Great Reces-
sion, underscoring how difficult it is to make accurate 
long-term forecasts like those appearing in the ICD 
report. 
The poorly anticipated Great Recession has impli-
cations  for  the  U.S.  dairy  industry:  Lowell  Bryan, 
business analyst, writing in the McKinsey quarterly, 
notes  that  the  Great  Recession  “…shook  the  con-
fidence of many business leaders in their ability to 
see the future well enough to take bold action [7].” 
Eschewing timidness, the ICD advocates bold action 
on the part of the U.S. dairy industry to take advantage 
of foreign market opportunities. However, the report 
does offer a caveat in noting that the “…analyses and 
conclusions should not be construed as definitive fore-
casts or guarantees of future results [25, p. 3].” 
An  additional  caveat  seems  appropriate.  Many 
countries  identified  by  the  ICD  as  growth  markets 
for dairy products are difficult places to do business. 
The World Bank’s Doing Business 2010 report ranks 
countries from 1 to 183 based on 10 criteria that affect 
the ease of doing business in the countries. Criteria 
include such things as enforcing contracts, employ-
ing workers, getting credit, paying taxes, and closing 
a business [45]. Table 1 shows ease of doing busi-
ness rankings for several countries within each of the 
regions designated by ICD as leading potential mar-
kets for U.S. dairy exports. These countries were also 
top-10 importers of one or more dairy products from 
the U.S. in 2008. 
Six of the 14 countries in Table 1 have rankings that 
identify them as more difficult than average places to 
do business. North Africa and three countries in the 
Asia group rank among the most difficult countries in 
which to do business. China ranks in the middle. 
U.S.  firms  thinking  of  expanding  dairy  product 
exports will note that the U.S. ranking of 4 identifies 
the U.S. domestic market as an easier place to do busi-
ness than any of the foreign markets listed in Table 1. 
However, as indicated earlier, the growth of the U.S. 
dairy product market will be slower than that of many 
of those countries.
The ICD argues that the U.S. dairy industry can be 
well positioned to capture the demand gap (excess of 
demand over supply) in the near term (10-15 years). 
But, beyond this 10-15 year window of opportunity, 
new  sources  of  low-cost  supply  from  Brazil  and 
Ukraine (and possibly other countries) might deliver 
significant quantities of competing dairy product sup-
plies onto the global market. 
TABLE 1.   World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rankings for 
Selected Dairy Importing Countries, 2010 2
Region and Country Ease of Doing Business Ranking
Asia:
China 89 
















Source: World Bank Group [45].
2Figures used for rankings cover period of June 2008-May 2009. 
Key: 1 = greatest ease of doing business; 183 = greatest difficulty of 
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Brazil’s  emergence  as  a  major  competing  player 
in dairy export markets may be delayed sufficiently 
to give U.S. dairy firms the 10 to 15 year window of 
opportunity mentioned in the Center’s report. How-
ever, a Babcock Institute Country Study indicates that 
Brazil could become a leading global dairy exporter 
(especially of whole milk powder) as early as 2015 
[16]. This estimate, which is based on projections of 
growth in domestic production and consumption that 
were plausible in mid-2008, suggests that Brazil could 
export about four million tons of milk equivalent prod-
ucts by 2015. If achieved, this export total would put 
Brazil behind only New Zealand, Germany, France, 
and Australia in terms of tonnage of dairy exports. 
It  is  doubtful  whether  the  Ukraine  will  become 
a  major  dairy  exporter  any  time  in  the  foreseeable 
future. The ICD concedes that the Ukraine has prob-
lems with a struggling economy, a poor chilled sup-
ply chain infrastructure, and persistent quality issues. 
The Economist provides additional insights about the 
Ukraine’s  institutions  and  economy,  in  these  terms 
[20]:
Corruption is rife, the courts are bent, institutions 
are dysfunctional and the economy (dominated by 
Soviet-era steel and chemical factories) is sick.
Ukraine’s problems in agriculture stem partly from 
the country’s inability to transition effectively from a 
Soviet-style, state-owned and collectivist farming and 
processing system to a market-based agricultural sec-
tor. Ukraine’s economy also was hit hard by the 2008-
2009 global recession. As a result of such problems, 
the Ukraine has been slow to realize its potential for 
producing quality dairy products and other agricul-
tural commodities. Cynics once labeled Brazil as “a 
country of the future and always will be.” Brazil has 
changed for the better. But, unless there are big and 
fairly timely changes, the label once reserved for Bra-
zil will fit the Ukraine. 
New  sources  of  dairy  product  supplies  may 
emerge before 10-15 years from places other than 
Brazil and possibly the Ukraine. New Zealand may 
not be able to increase domestic milk production by 
more than about 30 percent in the next five years. 
While this is a reasonable supply forecast, it fails 
to  recognize  that  Fonterra  of  New  Zealand—the 
world’s largest dairy exporting firm—has developed 
the ability to access dairy products from multiple 
country  locations,  including  the  U.S.  and  South 
America.  Fonterra  is  likely  to  use  this  ability  to 
access dairy products from multiple locations to fill 
part of the emerging global dairy product demand 
gap. Large companies such as Nestle—which can 
access  dairy  products  from  multi-country  loca-
tions—may also fill a portion of the latent demand 
gap identified in the ICD report. 
The ICD conveys mixed signals about how soon 
the U.S. dairy industry will need to make the changes 
needed to become a successful, consistent exporter. At 
one point the report suggests that the U.S. dairy indus-
try may have as much as 10 to 15 years (characterized 
as the near-term window of opportunity) for filling the 
emerging dairy product demand gap. But the follow-
ing warning follows [25, p. 10]:
This  window  may,  in  fact,  be  narrower  if  we 
return to a period of high prices which could has-
ten the emergence of a competitive source of low 
cost supply— thus, there is a need to take action.
The  warning  appears  appropriate  because  of  a 
potentially high probability that alternative sources of 
low-cost supplies will emerge before 10-15 years. In 
addition, U.S. dairy companies concluding that they 
have 10 to 15 years to take advantage of the interna-
tional market demand gap may fail to achieve early 
mover advantages. For evidence on this point, con-
sider the following comments made by Mr. Neville 
Martin, a New Zealand Dairy Board official, in 1995 
[33]:
Initial entrants into a market gain, on average, a 
15 percent advantage over second entrants. Third 
place entrants into a given market tend to break 
even. Entering a market later is a strategy for los-
ing money.
While early mover advantages probably cannot be 
defined as precisely as Martin suggests, it is likely that 
those advantages are substantial and argue for moving 
sooner rather than later into new export markets. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-2  7
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The ICD report listed four “wild cards” that have 
the  potential  to  significantly  change  dairy  demand, 
supply, and the comparative/competitive position of 
the U.S. dairy industry in global markets:
•  Currency (Exchange rates)
•  Oil prices
•  Shift to lower-fat milk and dairy products
•  Threat of substitutes. 
Currency (Exchange rates)
With respect to exchange rates, the ICD reported 
that, “Currently, third party sources are expecting the 
U.S.  dollar  to  appreciate  against  the  currencies  of 
other key exporting countries in coming years [25, p. 
22].” The report then comments about the impact of a 
stronger dollar while noting a few effects of a weaker 
dollar. 
As the above quote suggests, Bain & Company was 
not asked to develop detailed exchange rate forecasts. 
ICD instead accepted consensus views of economists 
and finance officials on exchange rate trends. While 
exchange rates are important to the dairy trade, they 
are  exceedingly  difficult  to  forecast  accurately  and 
currency  predictions  developed  in  2009  probably 
would have been of limited value anyway in view of 
international developments that have unfolded since 
that time. 
Exchange  rates  are  notoriously  difficult  to  fore-
cast  accurately  partly  because  they  are  affected  by 
central  bank  policies,  International  Monetary  Fund 
actions, World Bank actions, and the monetary and fis-
cal policies of individual countries. Predicting the net 
impact of actions of these players on a given country’s 
exchange  rate  is  problematic.  In  addition,  forecasts 
must take into account the impact of global economic 
conditions affecting interest rates and exchange rates. 
Thus,  the  exchange  rate  forecaster  operates  in  an 
extremely complex system that makes it nearly impos-
sible to forecast exchange rates accurately. 
A  few  tendencies  about  the  strength  of  the  U.S. 
dollar vs. the currencies of dairy exporting countries 
can be advanced. In regards to the European Union 
(EU), a strong-dollar/euro exchange rate would have 
been rejected as unreasonable prior to developments 
that unfolded in the EU in late 2009 and early 2010. 
It might be recalled that the U.S. dollar/euro exchange 
rate fell to a 14-month low of about 1.50 in October 
2009. Then the full range of problems besetting the 
economies  of  Greece,  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Ireland 
became evident and the euro weakened by 18 to19 
percent relative to the U.S. dollar over a seven-month 
period. In an economic environment where trouble-
some  sovereign  debt  problems—such  as  those  that 
battered Greece—can emerge quickly, the dollar could 
remain relatively strong for at least the next year or 
two relative to the euro because of the U.S. dollar’s 
value as a safe haven currency. 
It is even harder to forecast how strong the U.S. 
dollar will be relative to the currencies of other impor-
tant dairy exporting countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand  and  Brazil.  However,  Australia  and  Bra-
zil, at least, have burgeoning economies that should 
strengthen their currencies relative to the U.S. dollar 
over the long-run. 
One piece of evidence points to longer-term weak-
ness in the U.S. dollar. Economists for Global Insight 
forecast that the U.S. will run a relatively large cur-
rent account deficit (mostly an excess of imports over 
exports) of about 4.2 percent of real GDP from 2010 
through 2015 [22]. And during this period, the U.S. 
current account deficit is likely to remain substantially 
above the 3 percent of GDP figure that Bergsten of the 
Petersen Institute for International Economics identi-
fies as a sustainable target [5, p. 31]. A stronger dollar 
would limit exports and prevent the U.S. from closely 
approaching  the  3  percent  target.  Moreover,  policy 
pronouncements of the Obama Administration and the 
Federal Reserve give little indication that the U.S. will 
In summary, questions can be raised about implica-
tions of certain demand and supply projections in the 
ICD  report.  However,  these  questions  detract  little 
from the overall reasonableness of the projections. 
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pursue a higher interest rate, strong dollar policy that 
would jeopardize U.S. exports. 
On balance,  in the next two to three years as the 
global economy recovers, it is likely that the U.S. dol-
lar will exhibit weakness rather than strength. Mainly 
this is because a weak dollar will be needed to keep 
overall U.S. exports reasonably robust and the U.S. 
current account balance manageable [19]. A relatively 
weak dollar should help to keep U.S. dairy exports 
inexpensive at least in comparison to those of a few 
strong currency countries for the foreseeable future. 
Dairy farmers and exporters in countries with curren-
cies that are strong relative to the U.S. dollar (prob-
ably including Brazil and Australia) will be adversely 
affected when dairy exports priced in U.S. dollars are 
converted to their local currencies. 
Oil Price
We have no quarrel with the ICD forecasts regard-
ing the other “wild cards.” Oil price volatility can be 
expected to continue. This volatility can have complex 
impacts on the supply and demand for dairy products 
in the U.S. and other countries. The ICD recommended 
that  the  U.S.  dairy  industry  develop  a  contingency 
plan to mitigate the industry’s exposure to short-term 
oil price spikes and longer-term oil price appreciation. 
Shift to Lower-fat Milk and Dairy Products
As noted in the report, the shift to lower fat milk 
and dairy products already has occurred in the U.S., 
France, UK and Denmark. It is unclear whether this 
shift  is  occurring  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  Eastern 
Europe. The ICD notes that emerging markets bear 
watching to see if the trend will appear in those mar-
kets. Industry adjustments may be needed to deal with 
further erosion of demand for higher fat dairy prod-
ucts.
Threat of Substitutes
The ICD urges the U.S. dairy industry to be aware 
of the threat posed by substitutes. The report notes 
that while dairy ingredients are generally considered 
to be superior in flavor and function to non-dairy sub-
stitutes, the increasing incidence of unexpected price 
spikes has driven some consumer goods companies 
to relatively more price-stable substitutes such as soy 
protein,  maltodextrin,  and  other  vegetable  proteins. 
This is consistent with findings of the Babcock Insti-
tute. For example, a 2009 Babcock Institute country 
study found that Mexican dairy processors frequently 
substitute vegetable fats for dairy fats in a number of 
products and warned that Mexico would continue to 
be a price sensitive market where such substitutions 
would continue [17]. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-2  9
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Based  on  its  conclusions  about  the  latent  global 
dairy demand gap, the ICD identified and evaluated 
four strategic options that could more advantageously 
position  the  U.S.  dairy  industry  both  at  home  and 
abroad [25]: 
Fortress USA 
•  Complete focus on domestic market
•  Use of additional tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
overcome foreign competition 
•  Supply management as a means of balancing 
supply and demand and reducing price volatility
•  Attempt to limit the effects of globalization
Status Quo
•  Limited industry efforts to address globalization
•  Current policies and regulation
•  Opportunistic participation in global trade as 
prices allow
•  Individual companies may choose to develop 
differentiated export capabilities
•  Limited efforts to manage volatility
Consistent Exporter 
•  Commitment to global opportunities for U.S. 
milk supply 
•  Broad efforts to improve commercial focus and 
align product portfolio 
•  Collective action to reform FMMO and price 
supports
•  Efforts to improve forward contracts, and futures 
markets
•  Strong domestic market as a basis for global 
trade
•  Joint industry efforts to build insight/capability
Global Dairy Player
•  Consistent exporter strategy, plus:
•  Industry moves to an export-focused model that 
includes milk supply and processing facilities 
outside the U.S.
•  Commercial and innovation capability 
development
•  May include off-shore investment and other 
significant efforts 
•  Capabilities will support domestic market, 
though investments may be diverted globally
As noted earlier, the ICD Board recommended that 
the U.S. dairy industry pursue the consistent exporter 
option. Good reasons readily come to mind for reject-
ing the Fortress USA option. First, if pursued, this 
option  would  involve  the  U.S.  dairy  industry  in  a 
futile effort to limit effects of globalization and could 
result in abandoning dairy exporting initiatives already 
undertaken. Secondly, efforts to use additional tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to overcome foreign competi-
tion would conflict with U.S. commitments under the 
World Trade  Organization  (WTO),  North American 
Free Trade Agreement, and other trade agreements. 
Finally, supply management measures contemplated 
under  this  option  would  encounter  opposition  from 
certain  U.S.  dairy  farmers,  especially  those  seeing 
advantage in expanding their dairy farms.
The status quo option is not so easily dismissed. 
This option describes key characteristics of how the 
U.S. dairy industry currently functions and is under-
pinned by powerful forces of inertia. Many findings in 
the report suggest why this option is probably unsus-
tainable and not the best route for the U.S. dairy indus-
try.
The global dairy player option is regarded by the 
ICD as a stretch for the U.S. dairy industry at pres-
ent but might be a feasible option to pursue after the 
industry gains experience as a consistent exporter. 
Many components of the consistent exporter option 
would strengthen the U.S. dairy industry. Achieving 
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the results called for by this option would involve both 
company specific and collective industry actions: 3
Company Specific Actions 
•  Investment in cross border commercial 
capabilities/partnerships* 
•  Develop capabilities to package/manufacture 
high value-added products to meet international 
standards 
•  Reduce costs and increase productivity 
Company Specific and Collective Industry 
Action
•  Reform regulated milk pricing systems (federal 
and state) and price supports*
•  Develop mechanisms for risk management/
reduction of volatility*
•  Continue pursuit of trade treaties that provide net 
export benefits*
•  Develop sales/marketing capabilities
•  Develop ability to deliver products to customer 
specifications
•  Build on existing food safety assurances and 
traceability as a competitive strength*
•  Product and technology innovation (possibly 
with financial incentives)
There can be little quarrel with these recommended 
actions, although some listed under company specific 
and collective industry actions (e.g., developing sales/
marketing capabilities, developing the ability to deliver 
products to specification, and innovations relating to 
product and technology) might better be designated as 
important company-specific actions. But regardless of 
how the actions are categorized, they represent good 
business practices.
The initiatives that would involve a large compo-
nent of collective industry effort are likely to be the 
most  difficult  to  achieve.  The  reform  of  regulated 
pricing  systems  (state  and  federal)  and  dairy  price 
supports would clearly top the list in terms of diffi-
culty. The worthiness of reform of these devices is not 
questioned. The price floors provided by the USDA 
dairy price support program and the readiness of the 
USDA to serve as a buyer for surplus dairy commodi-
ties reduce the incentives for the U.S. dairy industry to 
develop new products and new domestic and foreign 
markets. At times in the past, the USDA price support 
program also has priced certain U.S. dairy products 
out of world markets. Thus, it is no accident that U.S. 
whey and lactose products have been big export items. 
Prices for these products have never been supported 
by the USDA. 
The ICD claims that federal milk orders increase 
price volatility and limit the opportunity for imple-
menting a well-developed forward/futures market for 
milk. It is unclear whether federal orders have strong 
impacts in these areas. But it is evident that the orders 
distort  internal  U.S.  and  external  milk  prices.  The 
price  discrimination  mechanisms  embodied  in  the 
orders increase Class I (fluid) milk prices, reduce the 
amount of milk going into fluid uses, and increase the 
quantities of milk entering manufactured uses. The last 
effect presumably increases the amount of manufac-
tured dairy products channeled into export markets as 
compared to a situation absent the orders. 
Economists have suggested that federal milk orders 
might be subject to challenge under the WTO dispute 
settlement machinery for distorting world dairy export 
markets. While such challenges may emerge, it is not 
clear which countries would have strong incentives to 
launch such a challenge. Moreover, other agricultural 
products and trade distortion claims are likely to rep-
resent a higher priority for countries that employ the 
complex and costly WTO dispute settlement machin-
ery to settle trade disputes. 
The ICD report contains few details on how the U.S. 
dairy  industry  could  successfully  pursue  collective 
action to actually reform the USDA dairy price support 
program and federal milk orders. Bain & Company, it 
should be noted, was instructed not to determine how 
to change U.S. pricing policies. This task is to be car-
ried out by dairy industry panels. Whether those pan-
els can achieve reforms is unclear. Talk of the need for 
3Actions followed by an asterisk are those requiring the highest amount of company or collective industry effort.Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-2  11
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reform of U.S. milk pricing policies is not new. And 
the  deterrent  effect  these  devices—particularly  the 
dairy price support program—have on dairy exports is 
recognized. Yet the devices have so far been immune 
from fundamental reform. Indeed, a dairy industry Rip 
Van Winkle who fell asleep in 1950 and who awak-
ened  today  would  have  no  trouble  recognizing  the 
USDA dairy price support program and federal milk 
orders. Rip Van Winkle’s experience underscores the 
amount of inertia that must be overcome before these 
devices will be reformed. 
Harvard  Business  School  strategy  guru,  Michael 
Porter, provides a concise explanation for the lack of 
needed regulatory reform in an industry (such as the 
U.S. dairy industry), as follows [38, p.87]:
Deregulating a protected industry…will lead to 
bankruptcies sooner and to stronger, more com-
petitive companies only later.
Elimination  of  the  USDA  dairy  price  sup-
port  program  would  be  a  suitable  objective  for  an 
industry  interested  in  becoming  a  consistent  dairy 
exporter. And waning industry support suggests this 
might  be  easier  than  a  major  reform  of  market-
ing  orders,  which  protect  politically-powerful  dairy 
regions of the country like the Northeast.
The current Dairy Product Price Support Program 
(authorized under the 2008 Farm Bill) contains inter-
vention prices for butter, cheese and nonfat dry milk 
that  are  below  world  market  prices  that  are  likely 
to  prevail  given  IDC’s  projected  world  supply  and 
demand  conditions. And  the  program  contains  pro-
visions  to  reduce  intervention  prices  if  government 
stocks reach trigger levels. The intervention price for 
nonfat dry milk, usually the largest U.S. dairy export 
item by value, has been consistently below the Ocea-
nia  skim  milk  powder  price  since  2004  [44].  Even 
during the severely depressed world dairy market of 
2009, Oceania skim milk prices remained above the 
U.S.  intervention  price  and  ended  the  year  almost 
twice as high.
Nevertheless,  the  mere  existence  of  a  market 
intervention  program  like  the  Dairy  Product  Price 
Support Program can stand in the way of the U.S. 
being perceived as a consistent supplier.
Pursuit of trade treaties that expand net export ben-
efits  is  a  laudable  objective.  Completing  the  Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations, which begin in 2001, 
could open additional markets for U.S. dairy prod-
ucts  and  eliminate  trade  distortions  associated  with 
dairy export subsidies. Eliminating export subsidies 
might be particularly advantageous for the U.S. since 
the U.S. is permitted to make only small subsidized 
exports compared to the EU (Table 2). Only in the case 
of skim milk powder is the U.S. permitted to export 
significant quantities of dairy products with subsidy.
However,  it  is  unclear  whether  the  Doha  Round 
WTO negotiations can ever be completed. After all, 
the Doha Round trade ministerials, mini-ministerials, 
summits,  and  negotiating  sessions  held  in  Cancun, 
Mexico  (2003),  Geneva,  Switzerland  (2004),  Paris, 
France (2005), Hong Kong, China (2005), Geneva, 
Switzerland  (2006),  Potsdam,  Germany  (2007), 
Geneva, Switzerland (2008), and Geneva, Switzerland 
(2009) all ended in collapse or stalemates. This is not 
an encouraging record. Moreover, big players such as 
the U.S., EU, India, Brazil, and China seem to be in no 
hurry to agree to proposals that have been advanced to 
date. 
For a host of reasons, the Obama Administration 
and  officials  of  other  major  trading  nations  have 
TABLE 2. Annual Dairy Export Subsidy Limits Authorized Under the WTO
Product EU-27 U.S. U.S. as % of EU
1,000 mt
Skim milk powder 323.4 68.2 21.1%
Whole milk powder  232.3   0.0 0.0
Cheese 331.7   3.0 0.9
Butter 411.6 21.1 5.1
Sources: Berry and Dobson [6, 12].An Evaluation of The Impact of Globalization on the U.S. Dairy Industry: Threats, Opportunities and Implications
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placed completing negotiations for the Doha Round 
WTO agreement negotiations on the back burner. 
The  Obama  Administration  has  also  chosen  not 
to bring trade agreements negotiated by the Bush 
Administration  with  South  Korea,  Panama,  and 
Colombia up for a ratification vote. In this environ-
ment, pursuit of trade treaties to secure additional, 
profitable dairy export markets may yield little, at 
least in the near term. 
ness man negotiating to buy 1,500 tons of baby 
formula in Southland earlier this year. He insisted 
the formula be supplied in sealed 1 kg containers 
to avoid the risk of contamination with materi-
als like talcum powder or chalk once it reached 
China.
This brief quote forewarns U.S. exporters about the 
risks associated with serving China’s growth market 
for U.S. dairy exports. Among other things, the quote 
suggests that products that reach China in safe form 
won’t necessarily remain that way. 
The USDEC took action in the aftermath of China’s 
milk contamination crisis to develop a Melamine Cer-
tification Program, which qualifying exporters could 
employ to assure buyers of U.S. dairy products that 
the products are melamine free. This timely action was 
useful for assuring buyers of the safety of U.S. dairy 
products.
U.S.  dairy  exporting  opportunities,  as  noted  ear-
lier, may be most abundant in developing countries 
in Asia, Latin America, North Africa, and the Middle 
East in the near term. These markets may not exhibit 
the difficult conditions found in China. But problems 
associated with product safety could emerge in these 
markets since firms in other developing countries adul-
terate milk and dairy products with water and harmful 
chemicals. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published 
by Transparency International is potentially useful for 
identifying markets where corrupt business practices 
and ethical lapses of the type that occurred in China 
might arise. The Asian, Latin American, North Afri-
Building  on  existing  food  safety  assurances  and 
traceability  as  a  competitive  strength  makes  sense. 
Exporters  from  most  major  agricultural  exporting 
countries pursue strategies that contain these compo-
nents. Thus, U.S. dairy exporters have little choice but 
to devote attention to this matter if they wish to remain 
competitive. 
The  melamine  scandal  that  struck  China’s  dairy 
industry in 2008 underscores what happens if food 
safety is given insufficient attention. The scandal arose 
because  melamine,  a  poisonous  industrial  chemical 
used  for  making  plastics,  fertilizers,  fire  retardants, 
and other products, was added to milk in China to arti-
ficially elevate the protein content of the milk. 
The  melamine  contamination  of  Chinese  dairy 
products led to at least four deaths and illnesses of 
nearly  400,000  people  [14].  Sanlu  Dairy,  in  which 
Fonterra  of  New  Zealand  had  a  43  percent  equity 
interest,  went  bankrupt  as  a  result  being  identified 
as a seller of contaminated dairy products. Fonterra 
found it necessary to take a US$95 million impairment 
charge as a result of problems at Sanlu Dairy. Fonterra 
also risked sullying the “clean-green” image of New 
Zealand dairy products as a result of the cooperative’s 
linkages to Sanlu and its less than skillful handling of 
the melamine crisis—mainly because the cooperative 
tolerated lengthy delays in getting contaminated Sanlu 
products removed from the market. 
C. Cumming, writing in the New Zealand Herald, 
argued that Fonterra should have been aware of the 
risks  associated  with  milk  contamination  in  China. 
Equally  important,  Cumming  showed  that  China’s 
dairy industry represented the “wild west” as a place 
to do business in a September 2008 article [8]:
…Fonterra must have been aware of the risk of 
product tampering in China. When the news [of 
melamine poisoning of milk] reached New Zea-
land this week, a Venture Southland official, Steve 
Canny, recalled the concerns of a Chinese busi-
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can, and Middle Eastern countries for which CPI fig-
ures are listed in Table 3 were Top-10 importers of one 
or more dairy products from the U.S. in 2008. 
 Transparency International argues that CPI scores 
below  5.0  are  “troublesome,”  partly  because  such 
scores identify a country where a corrupt, risky busi-
ness  environment  exists  that  discourages  private 
investment. Note that all but two of the CPI scores in 
Table 3 were below 5.0 in 2009 and that all the scores 
were lower than the U.S. figure of 7.5. 
While  importance  of  the  CPI  scores  should  not 
be overstated, they may have practical implications. 
Indeed, U.S. dairy firms entering developing country 
markets either as an exporter or a foreign direct inves-
tor may want to stress test their financial involvement 
in those markets to assess the impact of product con-
tamination problems such as those that hit Fonterra 
after China’s melamine crisis. 
TABLE 3. Corruption Perceptions Indexes for Selected Dairy Importing Countries, 2009
Region and Country CPI Score Rank Among 180 Countries Surveyed
Asia:
China  3.6  79 (tied with 3 other countries) 
Indonesia  2.8  111 (tied with 8 other countries) 
Malaysia  4.5  56 (tied with 4 other countries) 
Philippines  2.4  139 (tied with 3 other countries) 
South Korea  5.5  39 (tied with 2 other countries) 
Thailand  3.4  39 (tied with 4 other countries) 
Viet Nam  2.7  120 (tied with 5 other countries) 
Latin America: 
Mexico  3.3 89 (tied with 5 other countries) 
Panama  3.4 84 (tied with 4 other countries) 
North Africa:
Algeria  2.8  111 (tied with 8 other countries) 
Egypt  2.8  111 (tied with 8 other countries) 
Morocco  3.3  89 (tied with 5 other countries) 
Middle East:
Bahrain  5.1 46 (tied with 2 other countries) 
Saudi Arabia  4.3 63 (tied with 1 other country) 
Source: Transparency International [43]. 
Key to interpreting CPI scores: 0 = highly corrupt; 10 = highly clean.  High, low, and median CPI 
scores for the 180 countries surveyed were 9.4, 1.1, and 3.3, respectively.  The U.S. CPI score was 7.5.An Evaluation of The Impact of Globalization on the U.S. Dairy Industry: Threats, Opportunities and Implications
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SYNOPSIS OF ICD’S KEY FINDINGS AND EXPORTING OPTIONS
ing, the major uncertainties surrounding the impact of 
future exchange rates, and the difficulty of achieving 
certain collective actions associated with being a consis-
tent exporter. However, these are minor shortcomings.
The U.S. dairy industry may find it beneficial to 
support food safety measures employed by the U.S. 
Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA).  The  FDA 
employs practices which help to insure the safety of 
dairy products produced within the U.S. and at foreign 
firms that export dairy products to the U.S. 
The dairy and meat industries were among the first 
to employ traceability to protect food safety. Maintain-
ing traceability allowed dairy and meat products that 
were found to have unacceptable bacteria levels (espe-
cially of E. coli or salmonella) or intolerable levels of 
pesticide or chemical residues to be quickly removed 
from store shelves. Traceability systems allow retail-
ers and other units of the supply chain to identify the 
source  of  contamination  and  initiate  procedures  to 
remedy the problem. 
Traceability  is  designed  to  maintain  food  safety, 
but it also can be a component of product differentia-
tion. In view of food safety problems that have arisen 
in a number of countries, traceability as a component 
of product differentiation is likely to become more 
important. Moreover, the traceability of a dairy prod-
uct probably has a moderately high income elasticity 
of demand, especially for the growing number of mid-
dle class consumers who make up a large part of the 
expanding dairy export market. 
OTHER FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVES 
The ICD report marshals persuasive evidence that 
satisfies the primary and secondary goals of the study. 
The  Center  might  have  given  more  attention  to  the 
importance of early mover advantages in dairy export-
STRATEGIES FOR THE U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY IN THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
Strategy guru, Michael Porter, indicates that, “The 
essence of formulating competitive strategy is relat-
ing a company to its environment [39, p. 3].” The IDC 
clearly has provided U.S. dairy companies with a thor-
oughly researched, comprehensive description of the 
economic environment facing the industry. The Cen-
ter’s report also suggests strategies that would allow 
the industry to become a consistent exporter and com-
petitive in the emerging global environment. In partic-
ular, the recommended company specific actions and 
certain other actions describe strategies that it would 
be advisable for many U.S. dairy companies to pursue.
Much of the remainder of this paper will focus on 
identifying  strategies  that  have  worked  effectively 
(and some that did not work well) for major dairy-food 
companies that have sought to expand dairy exports 
or foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses. 
Many examples were obtained from previous studies 
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Generic Strategies
Certain  concepts  in  strategy,  while  not  “natural 
laws,” can be applied to advantage by companies in 
most businesses, including the dairy business:
•  When evaluating the international 
competitiveness of your business, benchmark 
against the best in the world.
•  If you produce a commodity and sell it in a 
competitive market you must be a low-cost 
producer to remain profitable over time. 
•  A firm need not be a low-cost producer if it sells 
a value-added (differentiated) product. Product 
differentiation does not allow a company to 
ignore costs, but costs need not be the primary 
strategic target for a firm selling differentiated 
products. 
•  Being a low-cost producer of a differentiated 
product yields additive benefits, and can make a 
firm a formidable competitor. 
•  A company “stuck in the middle” lacks the 
market share, capital investment, and resolve 
to play the low-cost game, fails to effectively 
differentiate its products, and lacks the focus to 
create differentiation or a low-cost position in a 
more limited competitive sphere. Such a firm is 
in a poor strategic position. 
•  Companies tend to define their business too 
narrowly. As an example, some U.S. dairy firms 
mistakenly define their businesses too narrowly 
as a subset of the dairy business, e.g., fluid milk, 
cheese, or whey ingredients rather than more 
broadly as the “dairy business” or the “food 
business.” This can limit a firm’s flexibility and 
strategic options.
These generic strategies represent potential sources 
of competitive advantage for U.S. dairy exporters and 
U.S. direct investors in foreign dairy-food companies. 
Moreover, as noted later, variations of these strategies 
have  been  employed  successfully  by  foreign  dairy 
companies, including global dairy players. 
Dairy Exporting Strategies
A. Zwanenberg, an analyst with Netherlands-based 
Rabobank, listed challenges facing international dairy 
businesses that are similar to those reported by the 
ICD. Zwanenberg argues that growth is a key compo-
nent of most leading firms’ strategies [46]. The growth 
strategies of leading dairy firms, the Robobank analyst 
notes, generally have focused on practices that help the 
firms to (a) become more efficient in manufacturing, 
(b) open new markets, (c) gain market share and mar-
ket power, (d) expand brand portfolios, (e) strengthen 
innovative capacity, (f) secure needed milk supplies, 
and (g) improve access to capital. 
In what follows, strategies of three leading dairy 
exporters  and  investors  in  foreign  dairy-food  busi-
nesses are analyzed to obtain insights for U.S. dairy 
exporters. The foreign firms that are the focus of the 
analysis are the Fonterra Cooperative Group, the Kerry 
Group of Ireland, and Nestle of Switzerland, arguably 
among the best in the world. 
Fonterra Cooperative Group, Ltd. 
Headquartered  in Auckland,  New  Zealand,  Fon-
terra had gross revenues of NZ$16.0 billion (about 
US$10.95  billion)  for  the August  1,  2008-July  31, 
2009 fiscal year [21]. 
Fonterra represents the 2001 union of the New Zea-
land Dairy Board (NZDB) and two large New Zealand 
cooperatives—Kiwi Cooperative and the New Zealand 
Dairy Group. In its earlier years, the NZDB served 
as  the  single-desk  (monopoly)  exporter  for  scores 
of small cooperatives. In 1960/61, for example, the 
NZDB functioned as the exporting arm for about 180 
New Zealand cooperatives [11]. As a result of industry 
consolidation, the number of New Zealand dairy coop-
eratives declined to four in 2000. Farmer-members of 
two of the four remaining cooperatives—Kiwi Coop-
erative and the New Zealand Dairy Group—accounted 
for about 95 percent of New Zealand’s milk produc-
tion in 2000. 
When Fonterra was created, the organization relin-
quished the government-granted monopoly exporting 
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retained exporting privileges that allowed the firm to 
capture dairy import quota rents in the EU, U.S., and 
certain other markets for six years [2].
The NZDB held the title of world’s largest dairy 
exporter during its multi-decade existence—a title that 
it passed along to Fonterra after the 2001 merger. The 
NZDB and Fonterra adjusted in logical ways to the 
evolving business environment. 
In  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  the  NZDB 
adopted a core strategy and certain subsidiary strate-
gies. The core strategy called for the NZDB to lift the 
30 percent to 40 percent of New Zealand milk sold 
as value-added (differentiated or partially differenti-
ated) products to close to 100 percent as soon as pos-
sible [41]. The NZDB’s subsidiary strategies mostly 
elaborated on how the Board would increase product 
differentiation, expand the international food service 
business, and take advantage of opportunities created 
in Europe by the Uruguay Round WTO agreement. 
The Board also sought to superimpose the core and 
subsidiary strategies onto a strategy of being supplied 
by the world’s lowest-cost milk producers. 
The  NZDB’s  strategies  evolved  during  1999  to 
2000 in ways that reflected in part the difficulty of 
selling almost all milk produced in New Zealand in 
the form of differentiated products. In particular, the 
Board’s strategy morphed heavily toward one empha-
sizing growth in this period, as the firm sought to cre-
ate a global dairy business four times larger than the 
New Zealand dairy industry of 2000 within 10 years. 
As part of these strategies, the Board sought to create 
value for New Zealand’s dairy farmers by manufactur-
ing and marketing (a) value-added dairy products and 
dairy commodities made from New Zealand milk, and 
(b) dairy products made from milk produced in other 
countries using the New Zealand dairy industry’s tech-
nology and experience. 
The latter point reflected the NZDB’s willingness 
to use foreign milk where shelf life restrictions ruled 
out use of New Zealand milk and to be prepared to do 
business in countries where tariff barriers priced New 
Zealand products out of the market. 
In Fonterra’s early years, the cooperative sought to:
•  Integrate the manufacturing and marketing 
arms of New Zealand’s major firms to allow the 
industry to compete more effectively in world 
dairy markets.
•  Obtain scale economies in R&D and brand 
development.
•  Seek coordinated acquisitions of, and joint 
ventures with, companies already operating in 
inaccessible parts of the world dairy market—93 
to 94 percent of the market. 
Fonterra’s 2002-2003 Annual Report contains ele-
ments of earlier strategies and, in addition, included a 
strategy calling for the firm to be an “effective devel-
oper of dairy ingredient partnerships in selected mar-
kets.” 
A  noteworthy  element  of  the  ingredient  partner 
strategy was the New Zealand Milk Products (NZMP)-
DairyAmerica  Agreement.  In  2001,  NZMP  signed 
agreements with DairyAmerica to become the major 
exporter of U.S. nonfat dry milk (NDM) [9]. Dairy-
America is an association of nine U.S. producer-owned 
cooperatives,  namely  Dairy  Farmers  of  America 
(DFA), California Dairies, Land O’Lakes, Agri-Mark, 
United Dairymen of Arizona, O-At-KA Milk Produc-
ers, Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers, Lone Star 
Milk  Producers,  and  St.  Albans  Cooperative.  DFA 
withdrew from the DairyAmerica Agreement in the 
autumn of 2009.
Fonterra argues that the agreement is advantageous 
for DairyAmerica because it allows the U.S. coop-
eratives to shift the job of exporting to Fonterra and 
concentrate on doing what they do best—market dairy 
products in the U.S. domestic market. The arrange-
ment  appears  to  be  unambiguously  good  for  Fon-
terra. Among other things, it gives Fonterra additional 
global market share for an important dairy export item. 
It is potentially a desirable arrangement for the U.S. 
cooperatives if they receive good value for the com-
mission they pay Fonterra for handling NDM exports. 
But, questions have been raised about the wisdom of 
the arrangement for the U.S. firms, namely: Does it 
pay to have a major competitor handling exports of an 
important U.S. dairy export item? Does the arrange-
ment preclude U.S. cooperatives from gaining needed 
exporting experience when the U.S. dairy industry is 
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DairiConcepts is another partnership between Fon-
terra and a U.S.-based company. DairiConcepts was 
created by Fonterra’s legacy organizations in 2000 and 
continued  under  Fonterra. The  DairiConcepts  joint-
venture was a 50-50 limited partnership between DFA 
and NZMP. This alliance combined DFA’s manufactur-
ing capacity with Fonterra’s innovation and advanced 
R&D.  DairiConcepts  has  manufactured  cheese  and 
other dairy ingredients for industrial customers. 
Fonterra’s  Dairy  Partners  Americas  (DPA)  has 
become an important player in South America’s dairy 
industry. This partnership, which was launched in Bra-
zil in 2003, continued to grow in 2008-2009, as noted 
below [21, p. 24]:
DPA  extended  its  manufacturing  footprint  and 
now operates at 15 sites across the region. Dur-
ing the year, DPA acquired additional production 
capacity at Ibia in Brazil’s central region, and 
opened a concentration plant at Palmeiras daz 
Missoes in southern Brazil.
The alliances and partnerships entered into by Fon-
terra carry a noteworthy benefit for the firm. Fonterra, 
via these arrangements, increases its capabilities as a 
supplier for multinational firms because the coopera-
tive can access product from multiple sources. 
Fonterra’s  Involvement  in  China’s  Milk  Scandal. 
Fonterra’s strategies generally were successful until 
2008 when the firm became embroiled in China’s milk 
contamination scandal. 
As noted earlier, Fonterra’s involvement in China’s 
milk scandal was linked to the firm’s equity interest in 
Sanlu Dairy. Sanlu began as a large-scale state enter-
prise raising dairy cows, and processing and packag-
ing milk and milk powders. The firm in the mid-2000s 
produced about 60 varieties of milk powder, including 
baby formulas and nutritional supplements, and had 
expanded into liquid milk, yogurt, and flavored drinks 
[36]. Sanlu believed that it would benefit from part-
nering with Fonterra since this would give the dairy 
access to Fonterra’s management experience, R&D, 
and advanced marketing skills. 
Fonterra also expected to gain important benefits 
from purchasing an equity interest in Sanlu for reasons 
mentioned by Mr. Andrew Ferrier, Fonterra’s CEO, in 
2006 [37]:
Developing  a  closer  working  relationship  with 
Sanlu  is  the  logical  next  step  for  Fonterra’s 
business  in  China…It  complements  our  exist-
ing  importing  and  consumer  businesses  there 
by partnering us with a local company that has 
access to local fresh milk supplies…New Zealand 
has been a successful exporter of dairy ingredi-
ents to China for decades, but as local produc-
tion increases to meet the rapidly growing local 
demand, becoming part of the local industry will 
give Fonterra further opportunities to employ our 
expertise in all areas of the business from milk 
collection to consumer goods.
A few observers have pointedly criticized Fonterra 
for not being better prepared for the melamine scan-
dal. Critics also question the cooperative’s continuing 
strategic commitment to China. Financial writer, S. 
Louisson, provided a representative comment [31]: 
Beyond the human toll, the scandal has damaged 
Fonterra  management’s  reputation—the  coop-
erative bosses took far too long to take effective 
action…Fonterra’s CEO, Andrew Ferrier, down-
plays  the  melamine  disaster  on  the  basis  that 
Sanlu  represents  a  relatively  small  investment. 
But the farmers may see it differently—as more 
trouble than it is worth and a sign management 
can’t control its sprawling empire.
What might Fonterra have done differently to avoid 
the problems associated with China’s melamine scan-
dal? Fonterra might have “stress tested” its plan for the 
equity investment with Sanlu Dairy to gauge how the 
operation would perform in the presence of a major 
milk scandal. This could have given the cooperative 
a more balanced view of the costs and benefits of the 
Sanlu  investment.  Moreover,  given  Fonterra’s  bad 
experience  with  milk  contamination  in  China,  such 
stress testing may be a useful strategy for future for-
eign investors in China’s dairy industry. An Evaluation of The Impact of Globalization on the U.S. Dairy Industry: Threats, Opportunities and Implications
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Fonterra’s  Recent  Strategies.  The  cooperative’s 
late 2008 and 2009 strategies appear orthodox and, 
for the most part, build on successful earlier strategies 
and carry limited risk. In recent periods, Fonterra has 
emphasized strategies to cut processing costs, increase 
processing flexibility, and change the capital structure. 
Processing cost savings were sought partly through 
scale economies. As an example, Fonterra brought on 
line the world’s largest milk drier at an Edendale site 
in Southland [21]. This drier has the capacity to pro-
cess more than 15 million liters of milk per day. 
The  cooperative  launched  efforts  to  improve  the 
firm’s ability to move production between commod-
ity  ingredients  such  as  powders,  cheese  and  casein 
to make the most of profitable market opportunities. 
To achieve this result, the firm strengthened the link-
ages between customers, global market trading, and 
the supply chain including all of Fonterra’s factories. 
If successful, this initiative will make Fonterra a more 
agile competitor in global dairy markets. 
Fonterra took steps to increase its ability to raise 
capital  in  2008-2009. This  was  necessary  since,  as 
noted  in  the  ICD  report,  capital  issues  represent  a 
long-standing problem for Fonterra. The cooperative 
described as follows how the problem worsened dur-
ing  the  2008-2009  recession,  necessitating  steps  to 
increase  farmer-member  capital  investments  in  the 
firm [21, p. 7]: 
Our current capital structure puts Fonterra at a 
disadvantage, with large sums of money wash-
ing in and out of the cooperative each year as 
milk  production  fluctuates.  The  situation  has 
been made worse by the global economic crisis. 
Although we are reducing our debt, we are still 
carrying too much. We are consulting with our 
shareholders on a multi-step approach to evolve 
our  capital  structure—based  on  New  Zealand 
farmer  shareholders  retaining  100%  control 
and ownership, and no consideration of a public 
share listing. We want to provide stronger incen-
tives for farmers to invest more equity in their 
cooperative…
If  this  strategy  works  effectively,  Fonterra  may 
adjust the way the firm’s shares are valued to reflect 
the fact that share ownership is restricted to farmers 
only. Still later, the cooperative could move to a sys-
tem where farmers buy and sell shares among them-
selves, rather than transacting through the cooperative. 
When fully implemented, the system is supposed to 
provide additional permanent equity capital for Fon-
terra. 
These steps appear unlikely to deal effectively with 
Fonterra’s capital problems. First, there is no assur-
ance that farmer-members will have incentives to pro-
vide the additional equity capital needed by Fonterra. 
After all, dairy farming—even in New Zealand’s “no-
frills” farming operations—is a capital-intensive busi-
ness. Fonterra’s dairy farmer-members are likely to 
need most of the capital they can raise to fund their 
own on-farm investments. 
Fonterra’s dairy farmer members have long feared 
losing  control  of  their  cooperative.  This,  in  part, 
accounts for their unwillingness to allow Fonterra to 
make public share offerings to raise capital. Fonterra’s 
misadventures with Sanlu dairy in China probably will 
cause farmer-members to adhere to this view for the 
foreseeable future. Thus, capital shortages will con-
tinue  to  limit  Fonterra’s  expansion  capabilities  and 
global competitiveness. 
Accordingly, Fonterra’s officers and farmer-mem-
bers probably will need to devise additional ways to 
raise capital if the firm is to realize its full potential 
in  international  dairy-food  markets.  In  particular,  a 
capital-starved Fonterra will not be able to take full 
advantage of its ability to source dairy products from 
multiple country sources to fill part of the global dairy 
product demand gap identified in the ICD report. 
Kerry Group, plc
While no longer primarily a dairy firm, the Kerry 
Group of Ireland provides a clear example of how a 
firm adjusted successfully to a difficult business envi-
ronment. Headquartered in Tralee, Ireland, the Kerry 
Group, plc is now a diversified food ingredients, con-
sumer foods, and bioscience company. The firm grew 
from a small dairy cooperative that had sales of about 
$50 million in 1974 to a multinational company with Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2010-2  19
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revenues of 4.5 billion euros (about U.S.$6.4 billion) 
in 2009, a 128-fold increase [28]. 
Kerry currently has manufacturing facilities in 20 
different countries and 20 international sales offices 
in 20 other countries from which the firm sells 15,000 
food, food ingredients and flavor products to custom-
ers in 140 countries across the globe [27].
An  accident  of  history  shaped  the  strategies  of 
Kerry in important ways. In the early 1970s, a brucel-
losis eradication program reduced the milk supply of 
Kerry Cooperative (parent of the current organization) 
by about 20 percent. Facing this situation, the Kerry 
Cooperative’s management and board of directors con-
cluded that, if the firm was to grow, it needed to reduce 
its  reliance  on  commodity  dairy  products. Accord-
ingly, the firm embarked on a path that included the 
following strategies [18]:
•  Emphasize production and sale of food 
ingredients.
•  Acquire firms selling branded food products.
•  Beginning in 1986, exchange the assets of Kerry 
Cooperative for a majority holding in a public 
limited company, mainly to obtain capital for 
growth. 
•  Emphasize quality and continuity of 
management. 
•  Increase expenditures on R&D to 2 to 3 percent 
of sales in order to remain competitive in the 
food ingredients business.
•  Emphasize growth through acquisitions, 
especially of profitable food ingredients 
businesses. 
Certain of these basic strategies remain as promi-
nent parts of the firm’s practices to the present day. For 
example, Kerry has continued to make acquisitions to 
foster growth. In addition, Kerry’s R&D expenditures 
continue to be relatively high. In 2009, for example, 
Kerry’s R&D spending equaled 3.3 percent of rev-
enues [28]. Finally, as a result of share sales to 30,000 
customers, Kerry’s market capitalization rose to 3.5 
billion euros (about U.S.$5.0 billion) in 2009 [26]. 
While Kerry’s acquisitions remain a major vehicle 
for fostering growth, the firm’s portfolio of businesses 
is far from static. For example, from 2000 to early 
2010, Kerry acquired 51 businesses, purchased stakes 
in three other companies, and made12 divestitures [3]. 
In addition, Kerry’s financing of acquisitions has 
changed over time. Capital raised via share offerings 
was an early source of revenue for acquisitions and 
other business purposes. But Kerry made substantial 
use of debt capital for acquisitions during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In 2010, Kerry reported that its free cash 
flow (367 million euros or about U.S.$526 million for 
2009) will permit the firm to make profitable acquisi-
tions (possibly a large acquisition) without raising its 
debt as a percentage of earnings [28]. 
Implementing  these  strategies  propelled  the  firm 
into a world leadership position in food ingredients 
and other highly differentiated products. Simultane-
ously, these strategies and other decisions caused sales 
of  Irish-based  dairy  ingredients  to  decline  to  only 
about 12 percent of the firm’s total revenues in the 
mid-2000s. 
Kerry  did  experience  problems  during  the  2008-
2009  recession.  For  example,  the  company’s  sales 
of food products in Ireland fell about 8 percent from 
year-earlier levels in 2009 as Kerry’s brands under-
performed compared to private label products. In addi-
tion, the company’s food exports from Ireland to the 
UK were reduced by depreciation of the pound ster-
ling/euro exchange rate in 2009. Cost-cutting helped 
Kerry to limit the impact of the recession and related 
developments on the company’s profits from sale of 
branded food products.
Kerry’s Recent Strategies. Kerry’s recent strategies 
continue to emphasize product differentiation under 
what is called “Kerry’s Dual Strategy for Growth.” For 
its ingredients and flavors businesses, Kerry reports 
that it will [27]:
•  Leverage Kerry’s technology-based ingredients, 
flavors and integrated solutions in global food 
and beverage growth markets.
•  Realign the Group’s ingredients, flavors and 
bio-science businesses around core technology 
platforms and end-use market applications. 
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•  Continue to invest in added-value dairy, meat, 
convenience and carry-out food categories. 
•  Enhance brand, marketing investments, and low-
cost manufacturing.
While the recent strategies are orthodox and general 
in nature, they do involve sophisticated product dif-
ferentiation. The strategies for ingredients and flavors, 
in particular, build upon Kerry’s well-developed R&D 
capabilities  and  create  competitive  advantages  that 
will not be easily duplicated by competitors. 
Kerry’s success in transforming itself from a small 
dairy cooperative into a profitable multinational firm 
provides useful lessons for dairy companies in other 
countries:
•  Kerry’s early decisions were partly an accident 
of history. But the actions also reflect the firm’s 
decision to eschew tying its fortunes to the quota-
limited Irish dairy industry. 
•  Kerry’s shift from commodity dairy products 
to differentiated dairy products, non-dairy food 
ingredients, flavorings and bioscience products 
may be a useful model for other dairy companies. 
•  The firm pursued a strategy that involved trading 
Kerry Cooperative’s assets for a majority holding 
in a public limited company. By selling Kerry 
shares on the Dublin and London exchanges, the 
Kerry Group was able to raise expansion and 
operating capital. While Kerry’s successes may 
reside more in the firm’s ability to hire and keep 
capable management than with converting to a 
public limited company, the change to a public 
limited company may be worth considering by 
capital-short cooperatives located outside of 
Ireland. 
While  the  Kerry  Group  succeeded  after  convert-
ing from a cooperative to a public limited company, 
the difficulty of making such a conversion effectively 
should  not  be  underestimated.  Other  Irish  and  for-
eign dairy cooperatives making similar moves have 
not been as successful. The differences in outcome 
undoubtedly  are  traceable  to  a  number  of  factors, 
including differences in management and the product 
mix of the firms. Kerry’s attractiveness to investors 
probably is due partly to the firm’s emphasis on differ-
entiated products and its strong move away from com-
modity dairy products. 
Nestle
Headquartered  in  Vevey,  Switzerland,  Nestle  is 
the world’s largest food company, boasting sales of 
US$99.4  billion  in  2009  [35]. The  company  traces 
its origins to the Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Com-
pany founded in 1866 in Cham, Switzerland. Nestle’s 
food  and  beverage  products  include  milk  powders, 
ice cream, yogurts, bottled water, fruit juices, coffees 
and candies. Over the years, Nestle has developed or 
acquired a large stable of well-known brands includ-
ing Nestle, Nido, Carnation, Coffee-mate, Stouffer’s, 
Dreyer’s, Edy’s, Nescafe, Milo, Nesquick, and Purina. 
In 2009, Nestle operated 456 factories in 83 dif-
ferent countries and marketed products in more than 
140 countries [35]. The company is no newcomer to 
major foreign markets. Nestle claims that it has gained 
important competitive advantages from its long pres-
ence in major markets, noting that it has more than 
100 years of local experience in Australia, China, Ger-
many, the UK, and the U.S.[34].
Once  considered  a  “sleeping  giant,”  Nestle  is 
regarded as a model firm by many international dairy 
firms. Helmut Maucher, CEO of the firm from 1981 
until the late 1990s, is credited with awakening Nes-
tle from its slumber. Strategies that Maucher used to 
awaken Nestle, most of which relate to the company’s 
foreign direct investment and management practices in 
dairy and other food businesses, include the following:
•  Focus on the long-run and balance sales between 
low-risk and low-growth countries of the 
developed world and high-risk and high-growth 
countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
•  Keep brands local and people regional. Only 
technology goes global.
•  Deepen the pool of Asian and other developing 
country managers to acquire a cadre of 
autonomous regional managers who know more 
about the culture of local markets than Americans 
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•  Engage in continuous improvement and nearly 
constant cost cutting. Discover the root causes of 
competitive advantage for the firm. 
Helmut Maucher’s prescience about China’s emer-
gence as an important but risky country in which to do 
business was evident in a 1996 comment [4, p. 11]:
In spite of free market reforms...China (continues 
to be) a difficult and uncertain place to do busi-
ness. Yet, even with the risks, the potential gains 
are  so  great  that  no  major  food  company  can 
afford not to enter the market.
Presumably  such  knowledge  of  China’s  business 
climate is embedded in Nestle’s market intelligence 
archives. Thus, it is no surprise that Nestle’s China 
operations largely avoided the problems that struck 
Fonterra  and  Sanlu  during  China’s  milk  scandal  in 
2008. In part, this is because Nestle has long employed 
a milk collection system to obtain milk supplies of the 
needed quality and quantity directly from farmers—
about 600,000 in total—in China and other developing 
countries.
Nestle uses the milk collection system because the 
company considers it risky to buy milk from third par-
ties (middlemen) in most developing countries. The 
company also employs the mechanism as a vehicle for 
providing technical assistance and about US$26 mil-
lion in micro loans annually to the firm’s dairy farmer 
suppliers. 
Goldberg describes Nestle’s milk district system as 
follows: [23, p. 97]:
In  simplest  terms,  setting  up  a  milk  district 
involves  negotiating  agreements  with  farmers 
for twice-daily collection of their milk; installing 
chilling centers in the larger communes and col-
lection points in the villages or adapting existing 
collection infrastructure; arranging transporta-
tion from collection centers to the district’s fac-
tory;  and  implementing  a  program  to  improve 
milk quality.
The orthodox strategies and milk procurement prac-
tices  employed  by  Nestle  would  hardly  qualify  the 
firm as a model. However, the strategies and practices 
have contributed to the firm’s successes. 
Nestle’s Recent Strategies. While the basic strate-
gies have received different names under recent man-
agement, certain strategies appear to have remained 
largely intact at Nestle. Nestle in its 2008 Manage-
ment Report said that its aim was to transform the 
company from a food and beverage company into a 
nutrition, health and wellness company. Many of the 
firm’s longer-term strategies are being employed to 
forge this transformation.
Nestle  claims  that  it  possesses  four  competitive 
advantages that will help it make the transformation, 
namely: 
a)   Unmatched product and brand portfolio
b)   Unmatched R&D capability
c)   Employees, culture, values and attitude
d)   Unmatched geographic presence
Evidence  supporting  point  (a)  is  apparent  from 
material noted earlier. As evidence of point (b), Nes-
tle noted that the firm spent 2.0 billion Swiss Francs 
(about US$2.15 billion) on R&D in 2008, more than 
any other food company. In addition, Nestle had about 
5,000 people from over 50 countries working in the 
firm’s R&D centers, product technology centers, and 
application groups around the world. Nestle claims 
that point (c) permits the company to leverage its scale 
and take an agile approach to business opportunities. 
It also supposedly aligns Nestle’s 283,000 employees 
with the firm’s vision. 
Claims regarding point (d) are supported by data 
showing Nestle’s presence in over 140 countries. This 
point has implications for Nestle’s risk management 
practices.  The  company  has  orthodox  risk  assess-
ment  and  risk  mitigation  practices—e.g.,  hedging 
and supply contracts. In addition, Nestle claims that 
“The Group’s wide geographical and product category 
spreads represent a tremendous natural hedge [35, p. 
26].” 
Nestle’s  strategic  pillars  for  achieving  its  new 
vision are summarized as:
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SYNOPSIS OF STRATEGIES: FONTERRA, KERRY GROUP, AND NESTLE
b)   Operational efficiency
c)   Whenever, wherever, however
d)   Consumer communication
The  innovation  and  renovation  strategic  pillar 
appears very much like the continuous improvement 
strategy mentioned earlier. The operational efficiency 
strategic pillar calls for on-going cost-cutting initia-
tives that cover the entire value chain from raw mate-
rials, manufacturing, packaging, distribution, and the 
consumer [34, p. 46]. 
Nestle  describes  the  “whenever,  wherever,  and 
however” strategic pillar as follows [34, p. 48]:
For our consumer business, this means a multiple 
channel strategy, ranging from traditional retail-
ers—hyper and supermarkets, hard discounters, 
‘mom and pop’ stores, and street markets—to all 
impulse opportunities, especially street vendors, 
kiosks and vending machines that are so vital to 
ice cream and confectionary sales…The objective 
is to have our products available for any occa-
sion,  any  place—railway  and  service  stations, 
offices, sports centers, ski slopes, at fairs, exhibi-
tions and cinemas, in fact wherever people go for 
work, leisure and pleasure.
The  consumer  communication  strategy  seeks  to 
create strong consumer loyalty. To achieve this objec-
tive,  the  company  seeks  to  gain  deeper  levels  of 
consumer  understanding  than  its  competitors.  This, 
Nestle reports, is achieved by spending time living 
and shopping with customers, and getting first-hand 
understanding  of  their  needs,  motivations,  routines, 
purchasing habits, and decision-making [34, p. 48]. 
Nestle’s strategies appear orthodox and effective. 
The firm emphasizes product differentiation, near con-
stant cost-cutting, and gaining in-depth knowledge of 
consumer demand in the many markets the company 
serves. Secondly, Nestle has gained important early-
mover advantages for serving the developing country 
markets that the ICD report notes will become increas-
ingly important in the coming years. Finally, competi-
tors cannot easily duplicate the strategic advantages 
that Nestle has gained from its somewhat cryptically-
named  “whenever,  wherever,  however”  strategy  for 
serving developing countries.
The strategies of these three firms provide insights 
about what is required to become a successful global 
dairy  player. All  three  have  gained  important  early 
mover advantages for serving foreign markets. The 
early mover advantages will present a challenge for a 
U.S. firm that seeks to move from being a consistent 
exporter to a global dairy player. 
Importantly, the basic strategies of Fonterra, Kerry, 
and Nestle have remained relatively consistent over 
time. The strategies might be summarized as follows:
•  Each firm has adjusted strategies to deal 
effectively with changes in the business 
environment. 
•  Kerry and Nestle have placed heavy emphasis on 
product differentiation and the R&D needed to 
support product differentiation. 
•  Fonterra has emphasized scale economies in 
processing and has developed the ability to 
source products from multiple countries. 
•  Nestle and the Kerry Group have access to 
capital in the share markets. 
•  Fonterra appears not to have developed 
mechanisms that will allow the firm to acquire 
needed expansion capital. Thus, the cooperative 
will probably continue to place heavy emphasis 
on debt capital. Fonterra will be limited in its 
ability to fill part of the global dairy demand gap 
if the cooperative fails to develop new ways to 
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